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Punitive Damages: A Primer for Utah, 
Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The subject of punitive damages has always been con-
troversial. Some have considered punitive damages unbecom-
ing of the law. 1 Others have recognized that they serve 
important purposes in deterring misconduct of entities other-
wise beyond the reach of punishment.2 
The Utah Supreme Court recently reviewed the issues 
involved with punitive damages and adopted a standard of 
review in Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange.a Crookston 
stands for the premise that although there are some limits 
to punitive damage liability, these limits are not so precise 
as to allow the threat of their imposition to become a calcu-
lable amount, "thus diminishing the deterrent effect of puni-
tive damages."4 
This note examines failed constitutional attacks on puni-
tive damages under the excessive fines and due process 
clauses of the United States Constitution, and then outlines 
the considerations that must be met before punitive damage 
awards will be upheld in Utah. Finally, the punitive dam-
age Issues that still await decision in Utah will be noted. 
II. THE FACTS OF CROOKSTON 
Crookston arose when a home under construction col-
lapsed. The home was an 'earth house,' a structure designed 
to be partially covered with soil to take advantage of the 
1. See, e.g., Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1872), cited in Pacific Mut. Life 
Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 10:12, 1038 n.4 (1991), where punitive damages were 
described as a "wrong . . . a monstrous heresy . . . an unsightly and an un-
healthy excrescence, deforming the symmetry of the body of the law." 
2. SPe, e.g, Luther v. Shaw, 147 N.W. 18, 19-20 (Wis. 1914), cited in Haslip, 
111 S. Ct. at 1038 n.4. 
!d. 
The law ).,riving exemplary damages is an outgrowth of the English love 
of liberty regulated by law. It tends to elevate the jury as a responsible 
institute of government, discourage private reprisals, restrains the strong, 
influential, and unscrupulous, vindicates the right of the weak, and en-
courages recourse to and confidence in the courts of law by those 
wronged or oppressed by acts or practices not cognizable in or not suf-
ficiently punished by the criminal law. 
3. 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991). 
4. !d. at 809. 
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earth's natural heating and cooling.5 The house was nearly 
complete when it collapsed.6 The structure was so complete-
ly destroyed that the contractor who eventually purchased 
the lot and wreckage testified that very little of the original 
construction material could be salvaged. 7 
Fire Insurance Exchange insured the Crookstons for this 
type of loss, with the financing bank as the sole loss payee 
under the terms of the contract.8 The original insurance 
company adjuster received two bids for the reconstruction of 
the house, one for $50,951 and the other for $49,600. Mter 
examining these bids the insurance company's regional office 
extended settlement authority in the amount of $49,443.9 
Soon thereafter an adjuster with more experience was 
assigned to the case. 10 He commissioned an engineering 
report, limited to structural damage, and used this as the 
basis for obtaining an estimate from an inexperienced con-
tractor for $27 ,830.60.n It was revealed at trial that this 
contractor was the son of an agent of the insurance com-
pany, and that the bid did not include substantial amounts 
of work that would have been needed to fully rehabilitate 
the dwelling. 12 
Based on this bid, the new adjustor settled with the 
bank for a little more than $32,000, without notice to the 
Crookstons or mention of the higher bids. 13 Because the 
settlement was insufficient to cover the construction loan, 
the Crookstons were unable to financially recover from the 
loss, were forced to deed the home back to the bank in lieu 
of foreclosure, and eventually had to seek protection from 
creditors in bankruptcy. 14 
Justice Stewart pointed out that the trial court had 
before it additional factors that justified the imposition of 
5. !d. at 794. 
6. !d. 
7. Respondent's Brief at 8, Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789 (Utah) 
(No. 880034) (1991). 
8. Crookston, 817 P.2d at 794. 




12. Respondent's brief at 7, Crookston (880034). 
13. Crookston, 817 P.2d at 794. 
14. Id. at 795. 
l 
I 
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punitive damages. 15 He noted that the second adjustor used 
what the company termed in its defense, "sound business 
practices."16 Other employees of the company testified that 
they felt the Crookstons had been treated fairly. 17 Finally, 
the adjuster, who had a reputation of improving company 
profits, received two promotions between the incident and 
the trial. 18 
The Crookstons sued the bank for breach of the cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, 
misrepresentation and fraud, and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. 19 They sued the insurance company for 
breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and 
misrepresentation and fraud. 20 
The bank settled just before trial.:n Fire Insurance Ex-
change went to trial. The jury, having heard the above, 
awarded $815,826 in compensatory damages, and $4 million 
in punitive damages.22 The insurance company's motions 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, new trial and 
remittitur were all denied. 23 
Ill. ATTACKS ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
On appeal, Fire Insurance Exchange argued that the 
jury award violated federal and state constitutional due 
process guarantees24 and prohibitions of excessive fines. 25 
While the Utah Supreme Court was considering 
Crookston, the United States Supreme Court made two im-
portant decisions in regard to the federal constitutionality of 
punitive damages. 26 These decisions, Browning-Ferris Indus-









24. Appellant's Brief at 33, Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789 (Utah) 
(No. 880034) (1991). 
25. !d. at 31. 
26. Prior to these two decisions, commentators had written extensively on the 
subject of the constitutionality of punitive damages awards, see, e.g., Symposium, 
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tries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc. ,27 and Pacific Mutual Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Haslip,28 make it clear that punitive damages 
can be imposed without violating federal constitutional guar-
antees of due process29 and protection against excessive 
fines. 30 
The Utah Constitution's due process guarantee31 and 
prohibition against excessive fines32 are virtually identical 
to the federal clauses. Although the Utah Constitution has 
been interpreted to provide protections beyond those of the 
federal Constitution,33 Crookston was not reviewed under 
the state constitutional standards as these issues were not 
raised below.34 
IV. REVIEW OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN UTAH 
Although the Utah Supreme Court declined to review 
the Crookston damage awards for either state or federal 
constitutional infirmities, it did review the award m light of 
Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REV. 687 (1989), and many believed that they were 
not constitutional as imposed, see, e.g., Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Constitutional 
Case for Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269 (1983). 
27. 492 U.S. 257 (1989). In regard to the excessive fines clause, the Court 
said, "Whatever the outer confines of the Clause's reach may be, we now decide 
only that it does not constrain an award of money damages in a civil suit when 
the government neither has prosecuted the action nor has any right to receive a 
share of the damages awarded." !d. at 268-64. 
28. 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991). In considering the amount nf punitive damages in 
a case the Court said: 
One must concede that unlimited jury discretion-or unlimited judi-
cial discretion for that matter-in the fixing of punitive damages may in-
vite extreme results that jar one's constitutional sensibilities. We need 
not, and indeed we cannot, draw a mathematical bright line between the 
constitutionally acceptable and unacceptable that would fit every case. 
!d. at 1048 (citation omitted). 
29. U.S. CCJNST. amend. XIV, § 1, "[N]or shall any state deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law 
::!0. U.S. CCJNST. amend. VIII, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nClr exces-
sive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." 
31. UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 7, "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law." 
32. UTAH CCJNST. art. 1, § 9, "Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive 
fines shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted." 
3::!. See, e.g., State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) (opening unlocked car 
door to examine a vehicle identification number, although permissible under 
federal law, a violation of state constitutional guarantees); State v. Bobo, 80:-l P.2d 
1268, 1272 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("[A]ttorneys [need to I heed the call of the 
appellate courts of this state to more fully brief and argue the applicability of the 
state constitution .... "). 
34. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, l'W0-01 (Utah 1991). 
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Utah's Rules of Civil Procedure. The rules provide, inter 
alia, that: "[A] new trial may be granted . . . for any of 
the following causes: . . . (5) Excessive or inadequate dam-
ages, appearing to have been given under the influence of 
passion or prejudice. (6) Insufficiency of the evidence to 
justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is against the 
law."35 
The compensatory and punitive damage awards were 
reviewed separately by the court. The compensatory damag-
es were upheld because the trial judge gave specific consid-
eration, on the record, to the appropriateness of the 
award.36 The trial judge did not properly consider the puni-
tive damages aspect of the award, however.37 
The two part inquiry established by the court38 re-
quires the trial court, in reviewing punitive damages to 
determine: (1) that they were appropriate at all,39 and (2) 
that the amount is neither excessive nor inadequate.40 In 
this case the trial court properly established that punitive 
damages were appropriate,41 stating: 
During the course of the ten or so days that we tried the 
case, it was my observation that indeed we were dealing 
here with conduct which was pernicious, pernicious not 
merely in the sense of the defendant['s] having taken un-
d[ue] advantage of the insureds, the Crookstons, in treat-
ing their claim in a high handed fashion, but pernicious 
further in the sense that clear, unequivocal misrepresenta-
tions were made by agents of the defendant to the plain-
tiffs and to their counsel, and as if that were not suffi-
cient, pernicious in the form of conduct, which, while it 
may not have been geared to create emotional harm and 
suffering to the plaintiffs, was, at the very least, in reck-
35. UTAH R. C!V. P. 59(a). 
36. Crookston, 817 P.2d at 806. 
37. !d. at 807-08. 
38. !d. at 807. 
· 39. The evidence must be "sufficient to support a lawful jury finding of 
defendant's requisite mental state." !d. (citing UTAH R. CIV. P. 59(a)(6); Elkington 
v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37, 41 (Utah 1980); Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354, 359-60, 
(Utah 1975); Prince v. Peterson, 538 P.2d 1325, 1329 (Utah 1975)). 
40. Crookston, 817 P.2d at 807, (citing UTAH R. C!V. P. 59(a)(5).) (stating that 
the amount must not appear to have been given under the influence of passion or 
prejudice). 
41. Crookston, 817 P.2d at 807. 
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less disregard of their rights by dealing sub rosa with the 
bank and thereafter closing the file 42 
However, as to the second part of the punitive damages 
inquiry, the trial court did not consider the distinct factors 
that apply to punitive damage awards. These factors are 
reflections of the special punitive damage goals of punish-
ment and deterrence. The factors, outlined m Utah in 
Bundy v. Century Equipment Co.,43 are: 
(i) the relative wealth of the defendant; (ii) the nature of 
the alleged misconduct; (iii) the facts and circumstances 
surrounding such conduct; (iv) the effect thereof on the 
lives of the plaintiffs and others; (v) the probability of the 
future recurrence of the misconduct; (vi) the relationship of 
the parties; and (vii) the amount of the actual damages 
awarded. 44 
The Crookston jury had these factors before it,45 but the 
trial judge did not review them in considering the motion 
42. !d. at 806 (alterations in original). 
43. 692 P.2d 754 (Utah 1984); see also Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 
(Utah 1985). 
44. Crookston, 817 P.2d at 808. 
45. Jury instruction number 33 stated that after determining to award puni-
tive damages the jury should consider the following in calculating the amount: 
[S]uch sum as in your best judgement would be reasonable and proper 
as a punishment to Fire Insurance Exchange for such wrongs, and as a 
wholesome warning to others not to offend in a like manner. If such 
punitive damages are given, you should award them with caution and 
you should keep in mind they are only for the purpose just mentioned 
and not the measure of compensatory damages. 
In determining the amount of punitive damages, you should consider 
each of the following factors: 
1. the relative wealth of the defendant; 
2. the nature of the defendants misconduct; 
3. the facts and circumstances surrounding the defendant's miscon-
duct; 
4. the effect of the defendant's misconduct on the lives of the plain-
tiffs and others; 
5. the probability of future recurrence of the misconduct; 
6. the relationship between the parties; and 
7. the amount of compensatory damages awarded. 
Punitive damages should be more than an inconvenience to the defen-
dant and their amount should be sufficient to discourage the defendant 
and other companies similarly situated from doing or repeating such 
misconduct in the future. 
Respondents' Brief, Appendix H, Crookston (880034). 
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for a new trial on the amount of punitive damages.46 The 
failure to review the factors would not have been fatal of 
itself. But, because the amount of the punitive damages 
"exceed[ed] the bounds of the general pattern set by . 
prior decisions,"47 the denial of the motion for new trial on 
the punitive damages issue was vacated and remanded.48 
The Utah Supreme Court gave the trial court a gener-
ous amount of counsel on how to consider the issues on re-
mand. The court first noted that the factors it provided in 
Bundy did not give any guidance as to how they should be 
assessed or their respective weights. 49 The court said that 
this lack of guidance was a common problem.50 
One solution to the problem, the imposition of strict 
limits on the award of punitive damages has been adopted 
by some legislatures51 and courts.52 However, the Utah 
Supreme Court feared that adoption of an absolute ceiling of 
whatever type would "diminish[] the deterrent effect of pu-
nitive damages"53 because it would "allow potential defen-
dants to calculate their exposure to liability in advance."54 
Further, strict ratios would "not provide the flexibility need-
ed to deal adequately with the type of case that involves 
only minimal actual damages, but where the conduct of the 
46. Crookston, 817 P.2d at 807. 
47. !d. 
48. !d. at 807-08. 
49. !d. at 808. 
50. !d., (citing AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT ON PuNITIVE DAMAG-
ES OF THE COMMITTEE ON SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 
3-7 (1989)). 
51. Limitations take one of two forms, ratio limits and dollar limits. In regard 
to ratios, "See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-102 (1987) (punitives cannot exceed 
actual damages); Fla. Stat. § 768.73(1)(a) (1989) (punitives cannot exceed three 
times actual damages) ... " Crookston, 817 P.2d at 809. For examples of dollar 
amounts, "See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 51-12-5.1 (Michie Supp. 1990) ($250,000 
ceiling except in cases of product liability or intentional tort); Va. Code Ann. § 
8.01-38.1 (Supp. 1990) ($350,000 ceiling)." Crookston, 817 P.2d at 809. 
52. Crookston, 817 P.2d at 809, (citing Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 
318, 331 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb. 1981) (giving a formula of three times compensato-
ry damages); Triangle Sheet Metal Works v. Silver, 222 A.2d 220, 225 (Conn. 
1966) (allowing it only to compensate litigation expenses); and Kewin v. Massa-
chusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 N.W.2d 50, 55 (Mich. 1980) (giving punitive 
damages only compensate for intangible harm). 
53. Crookston, 817 P.2d at 809. 
54. !d. 
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defendant is so flagrant as to justify a large punitive 
award."55 
The court adopted a middle ground between allowing 
unlimited discretion and selecting a bright-line limitation.56 
The court examined its previous opinions,57 and observed 
that: 
The general rule . . . appears to be that where the 
punitive damages are well below $100,000, punitive dam-
age awards beyond a 3 to 1 ratio to actual damages have 
seldom been upheld and that where the award is in excess 
of $100,000, we have indicated some inclination to over-
turn awards having ratios [even] of less than 3 to 1.58 
The court said that in denying a motion for a new trial, the 
trial court need give no explanation as to the amount of 
punitive damages awarded if award ratios are within the 
above ranges.59 If the award is outside these bounds: 
[T]he trial court is not bound to reduce it. However, if 
such an award is upheld, the trial judge must make a 
detailed and reasoned articulation of the grounds for con-
cluding that the award is not excessive in light of the law 
and the facts. The judge's articulation should generally be 
couched in terms of one or more of the seven factors we 
earlier listed as proper considerations in determining the 
amount of punitive damages, unless some other factor 
seems compelling to the trial court. For example, a trial 
court might conclude that an award should stand, despite 
a ratio that is higher than that we have generally ap-
proved, because the defendant displayed an extremely high 
degree of malice, e.g., actual intent to harm or a high 
degree of likelihood of great harm based on the reprehensi-
ble nature of the act. 60 
fi5. !d. (citation omitted). 
56. !d. 
57. !d. at 810, (citing, in the case of awards under $100,000, Branch v. West-
ern Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267 (Utah 1982); Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37 
(Utah 1980); Powers v. Taylor, 379 P.2d 380 (Utah 1963); DeVas v. Noble, 369 
P.2d 290 (Utah), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 821 (1962); Evans v. Gaisford, 247 P.2d 
431 (Utah 19.'i2)). For cases in excess of $100,000 the court cited Synergetics v. 
Marathon Ranching Co., 701 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985); Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 
P.2d 766 (Utah 1985); First Sec. Bank, N.A. v. J.B.J. Feedyards, 653 P.2d 591 
(Utah 1982). 
58. Crookston, 817 P.2d at 810. 
59. !d. at 811. 
60. !d. (citations omitted). 
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The court stated that the purpose of these standards is to 
permit effective and reasoned appellate review, with appro-
priate deference to the position of the trial judge to ap-
praise the witnesses and the evidence, leading to more sub-
stantive review of punitive damage awards. 61 
V. CONCLUDING THE CROOKSTON CLEAN-UP 
The Crookston case was remanded for reconsideration in 
light of the above standards.62 The court then went on63 
to consider potential ramifications of its ruling. The court 
noted, without expressing an opinion as to its appropriate-
ness, that should additur or remittitur be granted in re-
gards to the punitive damages, the grounds for doing so 
should be explained.64 In addition, the court warned parties 
not to try to avoid the considerable deference given to the 
trial courts in this area by appealing rather than moving 
for reconsideration. The court said that if a party appeals 
an award without motion for new trial, appellate courts 
would assume that a new trial motion was considered sua 
sponte by the trial court and denied.65 
VI.PUNITIVE DAMAGES BEYOND CROOKSTON 
Crookston establishes a framework for the judicial re-
view of punitive damage awards pursuant to the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. It does not, however, lay to rest the 
issue of punitive damages in Utah. Both the holding in 
Crookston and Utah's statutory modification of punitive 
damage law may be subject to attack on constitutional 
grounds. 
A. Due Process 
The United States Supreme Court held that federal due 
process was not offended in Haslip 66 because: ( 1) the jury 
61. !d. 
62. !d. at H12. 
6.1. See id. at H1:i-14 (Howe, Associate C.J., concurring with reservations) see 
also id. H14 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
64. Crook~ton, H17 P.2d at 811. 
6.5. !d. at 812. 
66. Pacilic Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 10:12 (1991). 
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was instructed about the purpose of punitive damages67 
and evidence of defendant's wealth was excluded, by state 
law, at the trial;68 (2) post-trial review procedures were in 
place that required the trial court to reflect, in the record, 
why or why not the verdict was adjusted;69 and (3) appel-
late review of punitive awards assured reasonableness and 
rationality in regards to the punitive and deterrent goals of 
punitive damages.70 
The Crookston ruling is consistent with the require-
ments of Haslip except in one area-in Crookston the jury 
was instructed, in accord with Bundy,71 to consider the 
wealth of the defendant. 72 The Haslip court did not iden-
tify the reason that the exclusion of evidence of the 
defendant's wealth was appropriate. The Court simply noted 
that the issue was excluded at the trial pursuant to Ala-
bama law. 73 In this particular exclusion of evidence, Ala-
bama law is the common law exception rather than the 
rule,74 but if the Supreme Court intends to adopt the pe-
culiar Alabama position, the Utah Court's use of the Bundy 
criteria would be subject to attack under the federal due 
process guarantee. 
B. The Excessive Fines Clause 
In Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,75 
the Supreme Court held that between private parties there 
is no state action in the award of punitive damages that 
brings the federal excessive fines clause into play. 76 The 
67. Id. at 1044. The court stated that the purpose of punitive damages is, 
"'[N]ot to compensate the plaintiff for any injury' but 'to punish the defendant' 
and for the added purpose of protecting the public by [deterring] the defendant 
and others from doing such wrong in the future." (alterations in original). 
68. !d. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 1045. 
71. Bundy v. Century Equip. Co., 692 P.2d 754, 759 (Utah 1984). 
72. Fire Insurance Exchange, in the year of the Crookston claim, had a net in-
come of $23,000,000 and assets of $72::l,468,116. Crookston, 817 P.2d at 815-16 
(Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
73. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. at 1044, (citing Southern Life & Health Ins. Co. v. 
Whitman, 358 So. 2d 1025, 1026-27 (Ala. 1978) (liability for damages cannot be 
based on the economic position of the parties)). 
74. See 25 C.J.S. Damages § 126(3) (1966). "While there is authority for the 
contrary view, as a general rule the financial condition of the defendant may be 
considered in determining the amount of exemplary damages .... " Id. 
75. 492 u.s. 257 (1989). 
76. ld. at 263-64. The court stated,"Whatever the outer confines of the 
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statutory modification of Utah punitive damage law, howev-
er, requires remittance to the state treasury of fifty percent 
of any amount awarded as punitive damages in excess of 
$20,000 and attorney fees and costs.77 As Utah now has a 
pecuniary interest in the award of punitive damages, the 
distinction that existed between the award of punitive dam-
ages to a private party and the collection of fines by a state 
that was emphasized in Browning·Ferris is blurred. The 
importance of the distinction was reemphasized by the Court 
in Harmelin v. Michigan. 78 The Court said: 
As we have recognized in the context of other constitution-
al provisions, it makes sense to scrutinize governmental 
action more closely when the State stands to benefit. (We 
relied upon precisely the lack of incentive for abuse in 
holding that "punitive damages" were not "fines" within 
the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.)79 
VII. CONCLUSION. 
The proper method for judicial review of punitive dam-
age awards is now set out in Utah by Crookston. If punitive 
damages exceed compensatory damages by more than a 
three-to-one ratio, the punitive damages must be either 
reduced or justified; if not, a new trial must be granted. 
The issues of due process, implicated by the consider-
ation of the defendant's wealth, and excessive fines, given 
new life by the statutory levy imposed on punitive damage 
awards, still must be resolved in regards to both the federal 
and state Constitutions. 
Punitive damages are not popular, and many believe 
that they are damaging to the economy.80 It has been pro-
posed that they be sharply limited. 81 As noted in 
Crookston, however, punitive damages prevent egregious 
Clause's reach may be, we now decide only that it does not constrain an award of 
money damages in a civil suit when the government neither has prosecuted the 
action nor has any right to receive a share of the damages awarded." !d. 
77. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(3) (Supp. 1990). 
78. 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991). 
79. !d. at 2693 (citations omitted). 
80. David Gergen & Ted Gest, Ruling on Quayle v. Lawyers, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP., August 26/September 2, 1991, at 44. 
81. !d. 
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conduct on the part of defendants who are otherwise not 
subject to meaningful censure. 82 
David F. Barrett 
H2. "A $4,000,000 punitive damage award can certainly have a salubrious 
effect in inducing the defendant to bring its practices into harmony with common 
moral conduct and accepted business ethics, to say nothing of the requirements of 
the law." Crookston, 817 P.2d at 816 (Stewart, J. concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part); see also Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. ~14H, ~iH4 (Ct. 
App. 1981) (finding a design flaw in the fuel system of the Ford Pinto could have 
been remedied at minimal cost, hut "a cost-benefit analysis balancing human lives 
and limbs against corporate profits" dictated deferral of the correction). 
